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This comprehensive explanation has been generated from 17 GitHub source documents. All source documents are searchable here.
Last updated: October 7, 2025
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A transaction event log (TEL) that tracks the issued or revoked state of individual [verifiable credentials](/concept/[verifiable-credential](/concept/verifiable-credential "A verifiable credential VC is a cryptographically secured digital credential tha...")) (VCs) and contains a reference to its corresponding [management transaction event log](/concept/management-transaction-event-log), enabling cryptographically verifiable credential lifecycle management anchored to a [KEL](/concept/kel).
The virtual credential transaction event log (VCTEL) is a specialized transaction event log data structure within the KERI ecosystem designed to provide cryptographically verifiable tracking of individual verifiable credential lifecycle states. As documented in Document 1 and Document 2, the VCTEL serves two primary structural purposes:
VCTELs MUST be implemented as truly append-only logs. Once an event is recorded, it cannot be modified or deleted. This property is fundamental to KERI's security model and enables duplicity detection.
All VCTEL state changes MUST be anchored to the issuer's KEL through seals in interaction events or rotation events. This anchoring provides the cryptographic binding between credential state and issuer identity.
Every VCTEL MUST contain a verifiable reference to its governing management TEL. This reference establishes the registry context and identifies the Registrars responsible for backing the VCTEL.
Implementations SHOULD support multiple Registrars acting as backers for redundancy and availability. The threshold of accountable duplicity (TOAD) mechanism can be applied to determine the minimum number of registrar confirmations required.
VCTELs MUST use CESR encoding to ensure interoperability with other KERI components and enable efficient streaming and verification. Implementations should support both text and binary CESR domains.
Implementations MUST provide efficient mechanisms for verifying the current state of a credential. This includes:
Implementations SHOULD support ambient duplicity detection by enabling watchers to compare VCTELs from different sources and detect conflicting credential states.
While VCTELs provide public verifiability of credential status, implementations should consider privacy-preserving mechanisms such as:
The VCTEL operates within a two-tier TEL architecture as described in Document 13 and Document 14:
This hierarchical structure enables scalable credential management while maintaining cryptographic verifiability throughout the credential lifecycle. The VCTEL is tightly coupled with KERI's Key Event Log infrastructure, ensuring that all credential operations are authorized by valid key states and that credential state changes are cryptographically anchored.
The VCTEL serves as the authoritative record for credential status changes throughout a credential's lifecycle. As noted in Document 2, by maintaining issued and revoked states, it enables credential status verification and supports the broader KERI credential registry infrastructure.
The VCTEL is a foundational component in KERI's verifiable credential infrastructure, working in conjunction with management TELs to provide a complete audit trail for credential lifecycle management. The VCTEL enables cryptographic proof of credential status through its integration with the broader KERI event log architecture, as described in Document 6.
The VCTEL follows the general transaction event log structure within KERI, which is built upon the foundation of append-only verifiable data structures. According to Document 11, KERI's design philosophy emphasizes:
These principles apply directly to the VCTEL structure, ensuring that credential state changes are:
While the source documents do not provide explicit field-level specifications for the VCTEL data structure, the architectural descriptions indicate the following key components:
As part of the KERI ecosystem, VCTELs utilize CESR (Composable Event Streaming Representation) encoding. According to Document 10, CESR provides:
The VCTEL, as a transaction event log, inherits these encoding properties, ensuring that credential state changes can be efficiently streamed, stored, and verified across distributed systems.
While explicit field schemas are not provided in the source documents, the functional requirements described in Document 1, Document 2, and Document 13 indicate that a VCTEL must contain:
As documented in Document 13, the VCTEL is tied to KERI's identifier control structure through the controller's Key Event Log, which serves as the authoritative source for the issuing identifier's key state. This integration ensures that:
According to Document 10, all TEL events are anchored in a KEL through either interaction events (ixn) or rotation events (rot). This anchoring mechanism is the foundation enabling a verifiable credential protocol to be built on top of KERI.
The source documents do not specify explicit size constraints for VCTELs. However, as append-only logs, VCTELs grow monotonically with each state change event. The use of CESR encoding ensures compact representation while maintaining verifiability.
The creation of a VCTEL is initiated when a verifiable credential is issued. According to Document 15, the management transaction event log signals the creation of the Virtual Credential Registry (VCR) and tracks the list of Registrars that will act as backers for individual VCTELs.
The initialization process involves:
As an append-only log, the VCTEL does not support modification of existing entries. Instead, state changes are recorded as new events appended to the log. The primary state change operation is revocation:
According to Document 10, KERI follows a RUN model (Read, Update, Nullify) rather than the traditional CRUD model. In the context of VCTELs:
This approach ensures that the complete history of credential state changes is preserved and verifiable.
Verification of a VCTEL involves multiple layers of cryptographic validation:
As noted in Document 11, KERI's design philosophy emphasizes verifiable root-of-trust with no middlemen in the verification chain. This principle applies directly to VCTEL verification, enabling validators to independently verify credential status without relying on trusted third parties.
KERI's ambient duplicity detection mechanisms apply to VCTELs. If an issuer attempts to create conflicting versions of a VCTEL (e.g., issuing and revoking the same credential simultaneously), watchers and validators can detect this duplicity by comparing event logs. The first-seen policy ensures that the first valid version of an event is considered authoritative.
The VCTEL is a core component of KERI's verifiable credential infrastructure. According to Document 10, the anchoring of TEL events to KELs is the foundation enabling a verifiable credential protocol to be built on top of KERI.
The VCTEL operates within the broader KERI ecosystem, which includes:
The VCTEL tracks the complete lifecycle of a verifiable credential:
As noted in Document 10, there is a concept of ghost credentials - valid credentials within a 90-day grace period (the revocation transaction time frame) before being recorded in the revocation registry. This suggests that VCTEL state changes may have temporal considerations for finality.
According to Document 13 and Document 14, the VCTEL is part of a public verifiable credential registry - a form of Verifiable Data Registry that tracks the issuance/revocation state of credentials issued by the controller of a KEL.
The two-tier architecture consists of:
This architecture enables:
The VCTEL is particularly important in the vLEI (verifiable Legal Entity Identifier) ecosystem. According to Document 10, the vLEI ecosystem uses VCTELs to track:
The GLEIF (Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation) governance framework relies on VCTELs to provide cryptographic proof that credential information is verifiably authentic, accurate, and up-to-date.
The VCTEL is closely related to several other KERI data structures:
As described in Document 15, Registrars designated in the management TEL serve as backers - entities that maintain copies of and provide verification services for individual VCTELs. This backing mechanism ensures the availability and verifiability of credential state information across the distributed system.
Registrars function similarly to witnesses in KERI KELs, providing distributed verification and redundancy for credential state tracking. According to Document 10, a backer is an alternative to a traditional KERI-based witness, commonly using Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to store the KEL for an identifier. However, in the VCTEL context, backers provide similar witnessing services for transaction event logs.
According to Document 11, KERI's design philosophy establishes an unwavering hierarchy: Security → Confidentiality → Privacy, with security being non-negotiable at the foundational level. This manifests in VCTELs through:
The VCTEL inherits KERI's end-verifiability properties. As noted in Document 10, when a log is end-verifiable, it means that the log may be verified by any end user that receives a copy. No trust in intervening infrastructure is needed to verify the log and validate the content.
This property is critical for VCTELs because it enables:
KERI's duplicity-evident properties apply to VCTELs. According to Document 10, duplicity refers to the existence of more than one version of a verifiable KEL for a given AID. In the VCTEL context, duplicity would involve conflicting credential state claims (e.g., simultaneously issued and revoked).
KERI's ambient duplicity detection mechanisms enable anyone, anywhere, at any time to detect such duplicity by comparing event logs from different sources. This provides strong protection against malicious issuers attempting to manipulate credential status.
VCTELs must be stored in a manner that preserves their append-only properties and enables efficient verification. Registrars acting as backers provide distributed storage and redundancy.
The two-tier architecture (management TEL + individual VCTELs) enables horizontal scalability. Each credential has its own VCTEL, avoiding the bottlenecks associated with monolithic credential registries.
The use of CESR encoding ensures that VCTELs can be efficiently exchanged between different KERI implementations and integrated with other systems that support CESR.
While VCTELs provide transparency for credential status, they must be designed to minimize privacy leakage. According to Document 11, KERI acknowledges the security-confidentiality-privacy trillema (Smith's Triangle), where complete security, confidentiality, and privacy cannot be achieved simultaneously. KERI's approach prioritizes security at the foundational level while building privacy-preserving mechanisms on top.
For VCTELs, this means:
The vLEI ecosystem demonstrates how VCTELs can be governed through formal frameworks. According to Document 10, the vLEI Ecosystem Governance Framework defines information security, privacy, availability, confidentiality, and processing integrity policies that apply to all vLEI ecosystem members.
The virtual credential transaction event log (VCTEL) is a critical component of KERI's verifiable credential infrastructure, providing cryptographically verifiable tracking of credential lifecycle states. By leveraging KERI's foundational properties - end-verifiability, duplicity detection, and append-only logs - VCTELs enable scalable, secure, and privacy-preserving credential status management without relying on centralized authorities or trusted intermediaries.
The two-tier architecture (management TEL + individual VCTELs) provides the organizational structure needed for large-scale credential registries, while the anchoring to KELs ensures that all credential operations are cryptographically bound to valid issuer identities. This design enables the vision of a truly decentralized, verifiable credential ecosystem where credential status can be independently verified by any party without requiring trust in intermediaries.
For large-scale deployments:
Implementations MUST handle various error conditions:
Implementations SHOULD include comprehensive test suites covering:
For ecosystems like vLEI, implementations must integrate with governance frameworks that define: